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The Brazilian organic sector has experienced important growth during the last two decades.  The 
sector is being progressively shaped around four food systems: an alternative food system, which is 
strongly interwoven with the Brazilian Agro-ecological movement; two commercial food 
procurement systems oriented towards a domestic and an export market driven mainly by 
supermarket chains; and a public procurement food system, which still represents a small share of 
the sector. Brazilian smallholders are facing huge challenges to enter and benefit from the organic 
sector in a sustainable way. Combining the lenses of institutional economics and socio-
anthropology, we analyse six experiences of Brazilian smallholders as they convert to organic in 
three major food systems in order to shed light on 1) the governance of the food systems, 2) the 
constraints farmers are facing within the food systems and, 3) the benefits that they can expect from 
inclusion. We highlight the roles that NGOs, Faith-based organisations and public-related agencies 
play in supporting the smallholders’ inclusion in all three sectors. We confirm the arguments in 
support of pursuing the agro-ecological development based model in Brazil, but underline that there 
is a critical lack of support for famers included in the commercial market-oriented food systems. 
Considering the reluctance of NGOs and Faith-based organisations to support these farmers, we 
claim that efforts should be made to provide a policy framework to enable public related entities to 
secure a sustainable inclusion in these systems and exit strategies for those experiencing exclusion 
from these highly competitive food systems.  
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1. Introduction  
Global demand for organic products has remained robust, and is estimated to have reached 50.9 
billion US$ in 2008, doubling the value of 25 billion US$ in 2003. Most of the sales take place in 
the US and Europe (97%), with a growing commodity import from developing countries (Willer & 
Kilcher, 2010). The rapid rise of both supermarkets and an urban upper middle class consumer 
segment in the New Industrialized Countries of the South (Reardon, 2003) has created a recent 
important expansion of the domestic market in these countries, leading to progressive 
transformations and a growing structural complexity of their respective organic sectors. 
Both FAO and IFAD (El-Hage Scialabba, 2007; IFAD, 2002) see a promising opportunity for 
smallholders in emerging countries to increase their incomes and achieve an improved livelihood by 
taking advantage of the boom in organic demand. Many research results from countries such as 
India, Tunisia, Turkey, Cuba or tropical African countries confirm this optimistic view. They show 
that organic farming effectively has the potential to provide smallholders access to attractive 
markets with higher profitability, while creating new partnerships within the whole value chain and 
strengthening self confidence and the autonomy of farmers (Crucefix, 1998; Shah et al., 2005; 
Kilcher, 2007; Bolwig et al., 2009).  
However, some less optimistic outcomes have been highlighted. Gomez-Tavar et al. (2005) and 
Gonzalez and Nigh (2005) show how in Mexico, the unsuitable certification context and the highly 
competitive market for organic coffee tend to reproduce social inequalities between smallholders 
and larger market orientated producers, triggering the exclusion of the former. Similarly, Blanc 
(2009) shows how the Brazilian domestic market for organic vegetables is highly competitive and 
exclusive, and does not protect smallholders from potential hold-up situations exerted by powerful 
downstream partners. From a broader perspective, research underlines that smallholders from 
emerging countries - often economically marginalized and with a low educational background - are 
facing many challenges to enter the organic sector and benefit from it. Problems such as decreasing 
incomes during the conversion period and high costs for certification are serious constraints, 
particularly when no specific subsidies exist for organic production (Egelyng, 2009). Structural 
barriers to access credit, difficulties to create reliable market linkages and a lack of knowledge 
about organizational management are also considered to be highly problematic issues (Barrett et al., 
2001; Nordlund and Egelyng, 2008; Blanc, op.cit.).  
This paper aims to discuss these issues further within the specific context of Brazil and its growing 
organic sector. Setting aside rather contradictory statistical data, the Brazilian organic sector has 
experienced important growth during the last two decades, reaching 1,766,000 hectares and 7,250 
producers officially certified as organic in 2008, making the country the fourth largest in the world 
in terms of the total area under organic cultivation. The bifurcation of the organic production 
structure consists of both large agro-industrial farms and smallholders. This duality is also found in 
the organisation of agricultural policies in Brazil, where the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Provision (MAPA) represents the interests of the large agribusinesses and the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (MDA) represents those of the small and poor farmers. Initial efforts to regulate the 
organic sector were made in the 1990’s, whereas the social aspects of smallholders’ inclusion 
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became institutionalised with the election of the first left-wing Brazilian government in 20021. 
Many NGOs and associations from civil society, including faith-based entities, along with powerful 
organisations such as the MST (Landless Movement) and the FAF (Federation of Family farmers) 
laid the groundwork for these stronger social orientations in state agricultural policies. While the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) has steadily extended its offers in funding both farmers 
and farmers’ organizations to convert to organic production, an organic Law (n°10.831) was 
definitively passed in july 2009 after 15 years of negotiations and partial regulation of the sector. 
This law finally recognizes a wide diversity of ecological farming styles, as well as different 
certification schemes, as “organic,” including the Participative Guarantee Systems (PGS), said to be 
more adapted to poor smallholders (Fonseca et al., 2008).  
The inclusion of the Brazilian smallholders in the organic sector has taken place since the early 90s 
within four different food systems. One is oriented towards the export market. This food system has 
been the main driver of organic growth since the 90s, and in 2009, it accounted for 60% of Brazilian 
organic production. The three other food systems are all oriented towards the domestic market, 
which we will classify here as: 1) the “alternative food system” (AFS), which has historically been 
the ferment of organic production in Brazil, 2) the commercial market food system, driven mainly 
by expanding supermarket chains and the food system which has experienced the strongest growth 
since the beginning of the 2000s, and 3) a public procurement system launched back in 2003 in 
connection with the “Fome Zero” (zero hunger) program. The latter has been expanding rapidly 
since its introduction, even though it still represents a very small share of the organic sector (around 
3% in late 2008).  
This diversity of food systems, along with the support provided by specific institutional frames, 
public policies, and activists’ engagements, thus offers a broad array of opportunities for the 
smallholders to enter the organic sector. This with regards to the different constraints the 
smallholders face in production and organization, as much as the different competencies, 
motivations and perspectives they have. Meanwhile, the diversity offers a fertile ground to conduct 
a comparative analysis of the challenges the smallholders face when entering these different food 
systems and attempting to benefit from them. In this paper, we will more specifically focus on three 
main questions: how does smallholder inclusion practically occur in each food system? What - 
common and distinct - difficulties and challenges do they experience within each food system? 
What can we learn from the specific governance set-up in the Brazilian organic sector, featuring the 
smallholders’ interactions with the public sector, commercial market actors (e.g. supermarkets, 
exporters) and civil society organisations (e.g. NGOs, faith-based organisations, etc.)?  
These issues will be discussed on the basis of six different case studies of organic “experiences,” 
which combine data obtained during fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2009 in two localities, 
with data gathered in a PhD (Shultz, 2006), two Master Thesis (Almeida, 2009; Brancher, 2004) 
along with journal articles (Souza et al., 2005; Almeida and Abreu, 2009). These cases studies 
exemplify singular “experiences” of smallholders converting to organicproduction, in three of the 
four food systems mentioned above, namely: the AFS, the commercial food system driven by 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 The last Brazilian election was won by the incumbent left wing government resulting in a second-term (2011-2015). 
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supermarket chains and the export oriented one. Hence, the public procurement food system will 
not be addressed in our work. The main reason is that, in all the situations we faced, we could only 
find the public food system in combination with one of the other food systems, occupying a small 
share of the farmers’ outlets (maximum up to 15%). The secondary, but interrelated reason is that 
we couldn’t find specific works, which specifically address this food system and organic production 
due, probably, to its novelty.  
Before documenting and discussing these “experiences,” we will briefly introduce the theoretical 
perspectives selected for the analytical framework, and in the subsequent section, provide a more 
accurate description of the different food systems, which structure the Brazilian organic sector.  
 
2. Theoretical ground 
We will not be developing a strongly theory grounded approach. Still, our perspective is obviously 
critically influenced by our respective research backgrounds, hence combining - at some point - the 
lens of an economist, working with New Institutional Economics (NIE), with that of a socio-
anthropologist. References to concepts issued from transaction cost economics, along with 
organizational theory and more specific sociology-grounded views, will therefore be frequent and 
will inevitably influence our story telling and the framing of our analysis. A brief reminder of some 
basic conceptual notions is therefore necessary.  
New Institutional Economics uses the “transaction” as its unit of analysis. From a NIE point of 
view, exchange itself is costly, meaning that, in contrast to the proposition of orthodox economics, 
the behaviour of market actors can not only be explained and predicted by considering trade-offs 
between prices and production costs (including physical marketing costs such as those for transport 
and storage). NIE thus claims that taking into account the cost that actors face when trying to 
coordinate their exchange on the market is essential to understand individual and collective 
behaviours in this arena. These costs, called transaction costs, include the costs to obtain and 
process market information (information costs), to negotiate contracts with others (bargaining 
costs), to make sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract (monitoring costs) and to take 
appropriate action if this turns out not to be the case (enforcing costs). Hobbs (1997) classified these 
costs so information costs typically arise ex ante of an exchange, bargaining costs are the costs of 
physically carrying out the transaction while monitoring, and enforcement costs occur ex post of a 
transaction. 
According to the seminal work of Coase (1937), it is precisely to economize on such costs that 
economic organizations, such as farm associations, cooperatives, or privately run market 
intermediaries and wholesalers, emerge. Such organizations help secure the “critical mass of 
supply” for large outlets and manage the flux (production planning, delivery), and contribute in 
guaranteeing the reliability of the partners in the chain, as well as the quality of the goods (Hayes, 
2000). Any type of food system may call for such organizations, but their need is even more crucial 
within modern food systems and complex supply chains, such as those driven by supermarkets and 
agribusiness companies. Indeed, to lower the transaction costs they hold in monitoring and 
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enforcing the standards they set in terms of quality, size and delivery, supermarkets and 
agribusiness companies choose to rely upon a few intermediaries rather than many smallholders, 
making it compulsory for the latter to either form or join a farmers’ organization 
(association/cooperative), or to trade with intermediaries.  
Building organizations lowers or suppresses transactions costs; but it creates, at the same moment, a 
set of specific coordination costs related to tasks such as defining a marketing strategy, establishing 
a collective production and delivery planning, as well as specific governance and property rights 
arrangements within the organization. Transaction and coordination costs are interrelated and, from 
an organizational theory perspective, phenomena such as the emergence of an organization, its 
transformation and strategic moves, as well as its closure, are critically related to the dynamic 
balance between these two kinds of costs parallel to other basic economical data (demand/offer, 
price competition, etc.). According to this theoretical perspective, farmers will never build or enter a 
specific organization if the sum of the costs of transaction and coordination is higher than the 
expected profits. Conversely, existing organizations will explode if these costs become higher than 
the profits the farmers could expect in another market setting.  
Granovetter (1992), as much as Freeland (1999) or Freeman (1999), have all strongly criticized 
such a transaction cots approach, as it assumes that the behaviour of any actor is strictly guided by 
the perspective of maximizing profit in a self-interested perspective, hence falling back on an 
under-socialized conception of action. In line with this perspective, we assume that economic 
exchange, cooperation and organizational issues cannot be considered if the influence of peoples' 
existing social relations (Granovetter, op.cit.), or the norms and values shaping those practices 
(North, 1990), are excluded. Firstly, this is because farmers, like people in general, have social lives 
and opinions, values and beliefs that are, as much as their capacities, formed, maintained and 
transformed within social groups, families and communities (Bliss, 1993 ; Douglas, 2007)). 
Smallholders who are members of the same organization may therefore, to some extent, share a 
common history; have important kinship relatedness, experience intense vicinal relations, etc. Such 
intense sociability may build empathy, sympathy, shared values and lead to peculiar forms of 
solidarity, as well as deep-rooted conflicts, prohibiting cooperation between certain members of a 
community, or favouring specific alliances within a group. Secondly, because the exchange of 
products is at times also embedded in logics that are not only about minimizing costs and 
maximizing profits. Organic markets, and particularly those built within the “alternative” 
perspective, can in this regard also be explained by their specific transactional processes, in which 
values of trust, cooperation, profit sharing, social and environmental concerns are important issues 
of the marketing transaction. Hansmann (1996) explains the outcome of these ‘non-capitalist’ 
marketing organizations as a counter reaction to alienation or exploitation said to characterize 
capitalist (investor-owned) enterprises and market exchange rooted in capitalism itself. In relation 
to organic food production, alternative ‘non-capitalist’ market organizations, which emphasize an 
altruistic transaction process, could therefore be seen as a countermove to attempt to overcome the 
transactional outcomes - alienation or exploitation of Man and Nature - derived from the 
transactional processes inherent in a capitalist market exchange (Kledal, 2003). 
That is why, even if references to transaction cost economics will be of importance in our analysis, 
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economic exchange, cooperation and organizational practices will always be discussed regarding 
the relational and cultural aspects of collective action, too. As such, the perspective we develop here 
is part of a growing set of attempts to enrich our understanding of socio-economic changes by 
moving from a disciplinary based perspective to an interdisciplinary one.  
 
3. A quick overview of the Four Food Systems shaping the Brazilian organic sector. 
Within the four food systems currently shaping the Brazilian organic sector, the “alternative food 
system” (AFS) was the first to emerge back in the early 1980s. Civil and religious activists, such as 
the progressive wings of the Lutheran and catholic churches, neo-rural farmers, agricultural 
extension agents, along with associations and NGOs devoted to the promotion of organic farming, 
actively participated in the shaping of AFS. Interwoven with the increasingly strong national and 
international “agro-ecological movement,” they focused not only on production techniques and 
extension services, but also organized semi-closed circuits of exchange between farmers and 
consumers built on values, which stressed transactional processes of trust and social and 
environmental welfare, as opposed to capitalist transaction exchange outcomes, such as 
competition, exclusion and the concentration of production (A. Cohn et al, 2006 ; Brandenburg, 
2008). As of writing in 2010, this “alternative” food system channels half of the certified organic 
production within the domestic market via popular fairs, box schemes or direct delivery systems. It 
is particularly well developed in Southern Brazil, where the “Ecovida” network, notably, articulates 
a large number of alternative experiences, involving more than 1500 family farmers organized in 
associations and cooperatives. Formalized in 1998, the network is based on a regional scale 
participative guarantee system (PGS), which became the reference for the recent officially accepted 
PGS systems under the national certification scheme (Fonseca et al., 2005).  
Until the middle of the 1990s, the Brazilian government considered the organic movement as a 
marginal movement with no future (Darolt, 2002). However, pressure from activists and farmers’ 
organizations on the one side, and firms attracted by the organic market opportunities (producing 
and selling inputs, processing, export activities) on the other, drove the government to progressively 
regulate the sector (Schmidt, 2001; Medaets and Fonseca, 2005; Lima and Pinheiro, 2001). The 
implementation of a formal set of institutions, which regulate organic trade and markets, including 
the passing of a first “organic law” in 1994 and the accreditation of many certification bodies, laid 
the foundations for more formalized procurement systems to emerge. Many national and 
international actors, some with strong financial capital, entered the arena and stimulated the sudden 
rapid growth of the sector. The export market was historically the first to drive this growth, with 
Europe, North America and Japan as the main markets. In the early 2000s, organic exports from 
Brazil accounted for almost 70% of the production and, according to the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development, % of the organic production in Brazil is (2010) still being exported today. 
Smallholders2 make up only a limited part of these exports since the major organic export 
commodities are sugar and soya, which originate from the large estates in the Central West and 
South East region of Brazil.  
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2 Mainly producing cocoa, fresh fruits and coffee grain. 
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Next to this export market, a commercial domestic oriented food system, driven by national and/or 
international supermarkets, captured a growing share of the organic food market in the late 90s. The 
system has grown markedly since the early 2000s, when sales according to the Brazilian 
supermarkets association (ABRAS, 2007), began experiencing 25% growth per year. The global 
supermarket chain Carrefour (home base: France) and its main competitor Casino, with its joint 
venture ownership with the regional up-market chain, Grupo Pão de Açúcar, are major drivers 
behind this growth. Supermarkets had, up to this point, strictly targeted upper and middle-class 
urban consumers, with the price of organic products exceeding that of conventional products by 40 
to 300% ( Guivant, 2003; Kiss, 2004). The domestic market, as with export, requires the acquisition 
of third party organic certification. Intermediary companies and big farmers’ cooperatives are 
responsible for most of the logistics of the sector, acting as a link between the producers and the 
major retailers. However, smaller farmers’ associations, if they are able to deliver the critical mass 
of supply at the right time and of the expected quality, may enter these modern supply chains and 
supermarket outlets.  
Parallel to the privately driven domestic food system, a public procurement system launched in 
2003 was built within the broader government program “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger). One of the 
constituents of this program, the “Programa de Aquisiçao Alimentar” (PAA – Food Purchase 
Program) emphasized both “ends” of the food supply chain, the aim of which was not only to offer 
access to food for populations facing insecure food and nutritional situations, but also to guarantee 
market outlets and minimum prices for smallholders. In this respect, a Federal agency, the 
“Compania Nacional de Abastecimento » and, to a lesser extent, Municipalities and State agencies, 
purchase products from smallholders and distribute them to institutional entities such as schools and 
hospitals, as well as population groups considered as “vulnerable.” Part of the food purchased from 
smallholders in this program is organic. No data are available to assess the number of organic 
growers involved in the program but, from 2003 to 2009, 107 million $ - out of a total of one billion 
$ - was specifically invested in organic production. The program guarantees a specific premium for 
organic, 30% above a reference price set on the basis of local and regional market prices. To enter 
the public procurement food system, farmers have to meet specific requirements. They have to be 
approved as “family farmers,” i.e. they have to have a limited permanent non-family labour force on 
the farm (max 2), the farm must not exceed a specific size, at least 80% of their income must come 
from on-farm activities (productive or non-productive)3, and they have to be members of an official 
farmers’ organization (association, cooperative, etc.). Meanwhile, the amount purchased is limited 
to 1900 US$ per year per family4, which is the equivalent of one Brazilian annual minimum salary. 
This explains why, in all the cases studied here, the public procurement system was a) always found 
in combination with one of the other three food systems and, b) never exceeded 20% of the farmers’ 
market share. Indeed, ten% was the most frequent share we encountered. 
 
4. Case studies; Organic “experiences” of smallholders in the Brazilian organic sector 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3 As stated by the Agricultural Development Ministry (MDA) within its credit program for family farmers (PRONAF). 
4 From 2003 to 2006, the limit was set at 1,340 $. The value was updated in 2006.  
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This section presents six case studies of smallholders converting to organic production in the 
alternative system, the supermarket chains (domestic) and the export driven food system. In each of 
these narratives, we analyse the processes of inclusion of the farmers in the sector and their 
“experience” of the food systems, with an emphasis on trajectories, challenges and tensions that 
characterize the experiences. As we have already pointed out, the public procurement food system 
will not be addressed in our work, but will only be mentioned if farmers from the other food 
systems sell to the public food system.  
 
4.1. Experiences within the “alternative” food system 
The AECIA, Associaçao dos Agricultores Ecologistas de Ipê e Antonio Prado, and the ARPASUL, 
Associaçao Regional de Produtores Agroecologicos da Regiao Sul are both pioneers among organic 
farming associations in the Brazilian southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. Created in 1991 and 
1995, respectively, both are members of the Ecovida network with AECIA being one of the 
founder/charter members. In 2008, 35 families were members of AECIA and 50 were members of 
the APRASUL.  
Both associations were created under the influence of faith-based organizations5. These 
organizations introduced and promoted agro-ecological principles to the farmers and provided them 
with technical agricultural extension, facilitating their conversion to organic production. In the 
AECIA case, a specific partnership was established with an extension NGO (“Centro Ecologico”). 
Meanwhile, the organizations facilitated the set-up of farmer cooperatives linking them with 
organized farmers and consumer groups and future members of the Ecovida network. In this way, 
they helped the farmers by setting the juridical and organizational basis, which enabled them to sell 
their produce as “organic” to groups of consumers  through a Participative Guarantee System. In 
both cases, the producers and consumer groups included the famers in their network, offering them 
the opportunity to turn away from the wholesale market of the State Capital and to channel their 
production towards the fairs they were organizing in various cities in the State of Rio Grande do 
Sul. Such a shift went along with changing the orientation of production. From a mix of tobacco, 
fruits, vegetables and grains, the farmers from AECIA decided to specialize mainly in fruit 
production and the commercialization of juices and nectars, alongside small amounts of vegetables 
sold in natura. ARPASUL farmers abandoned tobacco, but continued a rather diversified 
production, growing and commercializing a broad range of vegetables, fruits, and grains, both in 
natura and processed (juices, canned goods, etc.). 
The farmers from both AECIA and APRASUL stayed committed to their original organic fairs for 
many years, with each family attending fairs twice a week. Marketing at organic fairs was, from the 
farmers’ perspective - and obviously from the facilitating entities perspective too - grounded on 
ideological values, much more than any consideration of economic efficiency. Organic market fairs 
were, on the one hand, considered as the only way for the farmers to maintain full control of the 
premiums. That meant they could sell their produce at affordable consumer prices, and hence reach 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 The “Pastoral da Terra” (Catholic) for AECIA and both the “Centro de Apoio ao Pequeno Agricultor” (Evangelic) and 
the “Comissao Pastoral da Terra” (Catholic) for APRASUL. 
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low-income consumers. On the other hand, participating in organic fairs was seen as a way to build-
up social ties and reinforce solidarity, both with consumers and among the farmers themselves.  
However, such a marketing option became progressively challenged. According to the farmers from 
both groups, attending fairs twice a week is a heavy load for a family-based labour organization, 
critically taking them away from working in the fields, while not always bringing in satisfactory 
earnings. To improve earnings, an attempt to attend a third weekly market fair was made, but, even 
when sharing this duty among the members, the option was quickly abandoned due to time 
constraints. Hence, the attendance of organic fairs did not increase production – and thus earnings. 
As a result, farmers from both groups progressively diversified their production. In the AECIA 
case, diversification started in 1995 and grew steadily so that in 2008, only 30% of the farmers’ 
sales were in the original market fair scheme. 60% of their products were then sold to small organic 
shops, restaurants and box scheme firms, mainly via phone and Internet selling systems6, but also 
via commercial agents (10%). The remaining 10% were channelled via the public procurement 
system. The APRASUL farmers began to diversify their outlets in 1998, when they entered into 
partnership with a consumer association and began selling their products - up to 25% - in the 
association’s shop and restaurant. In 2003, the APRASUL farmers entered the public procurement 
system, which accounted for 15% of their production in 2008. The farmers thus maintained the 
organic fairs as their major marketing channel (60%) until 2008, but a major switch occurred this 
year, when almost half of the farmers in the group decided to sell their products to supermarkets – 
via intermediaries - and to definitively leave the fairs system.  
Once again, the supporting organizations played a major role in these diversification processes. In 
both cases, they facilitated the establishment of new juridical structures (cooperatives) that enabled 
the farmers to sell their products to registered economic agents (intermediaries, shops, etc.)7, and 
helped the farmers to define their commercialization strategies, to build the appropriate networks 
and to improve their production planning. Meanwhile, the supporting organizations aided the 
farmers to gain access to funding from both the Government agency and other non-governmental 
agencies. AECIA received funding from Caritas Brazil in 1998 to develop transportation facilities, 
whilst they received funding for processing plants from State and Federal Agencies (Pronaf 
Agroindustria). ARPASUL became involved in the Programa de Desenvolvimento Sustentavel do 
Territorios, launched by the MDA in 2003, which generated 32.000 Euros for the association to 
build a market outlet, as well as purchase IT equipment.  
In both cases, the diversification of their production meant that the farmers abandoned some of their 
previous commitments. Only the remaining organic fairs and the institutional market – both of 
which enabled the farmers to reach low-income consumers - fit the farmers’ original value-driven 
marketing orientation. This was contrary to the intermediaries who were setting the prices and 
transforming the farmers’ production into luxury goods sold through the other marketing systems. 
The gradual diversification of sales and outlets gave tensions in the groups, illustrating the 
contradictory process of trying to raise incomes while maintaining practices of exchange embedded 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6 The association has its own web site: http://www.aecia.com.br/index.php#pop (accessed November the 25th, 2010) 
7 Such a shift in juridical structures is needed, in accordance with Brazilian law, so the farmers can commercialize to 
economic agents that request fiscal notes for any transaction. 
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in non-market orientated values. While the members from AECIA managed to go through this 
diversification process without major conflict within the group, the APRASUL experienced 
conflicts when a number of farmers decided to sell to the supermarkets. Many farmers considered 
that leaving the market fair system in order to deal with supermarkets would contradict the groups’ 
convictions regarding their transaction principles (fairness, social ties, etc.). Furthermore, farmers 
had to build a cooperative (for juridical purpose) and get third-party certification to deal with the 
supermarkets. The farmers who were not interested in entering this new marketing channel didn’t 
relish the idea of sharing these new costs. As a result, the ARPASUL group split into two sub-
groups. One group maintained their activity on behalf of the association, marketing most of their 
production at the fairs, while the second group started a cooperative, selling to supermarkets via 
intermediaries, but continued to use the ARPASUL name.  
 
4.2. Experiences within the supermarket driven food system (domestic) 
The farmers from the Associaçao de Produtores Agricolas de Colombo (APAC - State of Paranà) 
and those from the rural neighbourhood of Veravà (State of Sao Paulo) are vegetables growers who 
converted to organic in the 90s, commercializing in natura vegetables to supermarkets of the State 
capitals (respectively Curitiba and Sao Paulo).  
The Associaçao de Produtores Agricolas de Colombo (APAC) was established in the early 80s, 
encouraged and aided by the Federal extension service organization (EMATER8) and the 
municipality of Colombo. For the 25 farmers involved in the process, it was an opportunity to turn 
away from the wholesale market (CEASA) and develop new market outlets (churches community 
networks, small shops and restaurants). The APAC growers then entered the organic market in early 
1997, benefiting from a partnership made with the Parana’s Organic Association (AOPA), an 
organization born a few years before (1995) to promote agro-ecology for the smallholders in the 
State. This partner benefited the APAC growers with its new connections to some of Curitiba’s big 
retailers. They began selling in natura vegetables to supermarkets of the state’s capital, and were 
included in a wide network involving almost 300 families from various neighbouring 
municipalities.  
In 1998, this network was highly prosperous. The farmers were selling 1200 tons of vegetables to 
28 supermarkets, employing 22 people for processing, packing and delivering alongside 20 
commercial agents who coordinated relations with the supermarkets. However, the system quickly 
experienced  serious difficulties, which led to its failure. Changing transaction rules imposed by 
supermarkets (lower prices together with more stringent norms regarding quality and regularity for 
deliveries) along with management deficiencies within the group in which the APAC farmers were 
included, led to a massive trade gap, leaving APAC with a financial deficit of about 180.000 Euros, 
which resulted in the farmers receiving no income for six months. While the AOPA decided to stop 
dealing with any supermarkets and to turn back to “alternative” marketing channels, the APAC 
growers maintained their relations with the retailers. In order to enhance their bargaining power and 
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to enable non-sold organic items to find their way to the conventional market instead of making a 
loss, they chose to include conventional farmers in their association. This strategy was a success as, 
in 2002, 100 farmers, of which 30 were organic growers and 10 were in the process of conversion, 
sold their fruit and vegetable to 52 supermarket outlets including major retailers such as 
“Carrefour,” “Pao de Acucar,” “Zaffari S.A.” and “Wall Mart.” At this time, the APAC was 
employing 40 people, who dealt with the commercial, administrative and technical side of the 
business while maintaining the physical premises, which included cold storage facilities, packing 
machines etc. that had been financed by public funds.  
However, a second crisis occurred in 2005. From 2000 onwards, organic sales as well as the 
number of suppliers increased and the sector experienced growing competition between new 
intermediaries and cooperatives of regional scope (Cultivar, Santo Onofre, Rio de Una, etc.). 
Supermarkets began setting new and tighter rules on transactions at the expense of the farmers, such 
as: 1) the farmers would no longer receive payments for non-sold items, whereas before the loss 
was divided equally between the supermarkets and the farmers, 2) the Farmers would now have to 
pay a fee for renting floor space, 3) marketing fees would increase for products registered as sold by 
the supermarket, 4) supermarket credit was extended with farmers having to wait 120 days for 
payment as opposed to the previous 45 days and, 5) 20% of the farmers’ produce was to be sold at 
discount prices whereas before it was 5%. Under these new conditions, the success of APAC came 
to a sudden end. The association had to disband having not paid its growers for several months and 
with a debt of 250,000 dollars. Organic farmers went back to selling individually most of their 
products (still as organic) to intermediary firms that progressively took over the middle-market 
business in the State9, and the leftovers were sold as non-organic in the wholesale market (CEASA) 
and in Municipal markets.  
The story of the Veravà farmers is very similar. Veravà is a rural neighbourhood in the Ibiunà 
municipality located in the Metropolitan Region of Sao Paulo. The farmers were experiencing 
serious difficulties in selling their vegetables on the wholesale market of the Capital in the early 
90s. At the instigation of faith-based activists and leaders from the Organic Agriculture Association 
(AAO), some of the farmers converted to organic production. Funds from a charitable organization 
enabled the hiring of agronomists and the organization of organic farming classes, while a 
marketing system linking them to Sao Paulo’s low-class consumers, was set up. However, few 
farmers became involved in the system, as the outlets were very limited. This situation changed in 
1995, when two neo-rural farmers from a neighbouring district joined the group and launched a 
retail network with supermarkets in the capital, creating considerable local demand. As a result, 50 
farmers from the neighbourhood - corresponding to 80% of the farmers from the locality - had 
converted to organic production in 1999. Following the initiative of the two originators of the retail 
network, three different juridical entities organized around the same name - “Horta e Arte” - were 
established: 1) an association to collectively plan the production and to discuss and make strategic 
decisions, 2) a cooperative for the grouped purchase of inputs and, 3) a firm to manage the 
transactions with the supermarkets. To respond to retailer demand, farmers from other 
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de Una” (established in 2000), “Sitio Tucano” and “Sabores da Natureza”. 
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neighbourhoods joined the group, which numbered 135 members in 1999. At this time, around 30 
people were employed to pack, deliver and sell the products and to provide an extension service for 
the farmers. A processing unit was built and trucks were purchased, notably with the help of funds 
(50,000 euros) received from the MDA to improve the association’s facilities. 
In the Veravàs case, just like in Colombo, farmers quickly ran into organizational and market 
problems, which led to the failure of the venture. Firstly, starting in 1995, the farmers’ association 
(H&A), which provided the space for the participation of the smallholders in decision making, 
steadily weakened while the firm (H&A) took charge of the developmental process and increasingly 
took the role of a private intermediary between the farmers and supermarkets. In 2000, a decision 
was made to change the individual organic certifications of the farmers to a group certification 
(IBD) in the name of H&A. This decision dramatically reduced the farmers’ certification costs, but 
it also made them captives of the organisation. The group certification was paid under the covenant 
that the farmers could not sell their products to other organic outlets without the agreement of the 
H&A management team. Secondly, from 2000, H&A (the firm) was facing growing competition 
from new intermediaries and cooperatives of regional scope (Cultivar, Santo Onofre etc.), which 
were involved in both the conventional and organic sector. These intermediaries, therefore, had 
lower operational costs and stronger bargaining power with the major retailers. H&A (the firm) 
passed on the tougher transaction requirements of supermarkets to the farmers, the result of which 
was that some of the farmers could not keep up with the pace and lost most of their contracts with 
H&A. With a sudden loss in earnings, these farmers quickly lost their capacity to invest (in 
irrigation, tractors and greenhouses) and became progressively excluded from farming.  
In response to these increasingly harsh transaction conditions imposed by the H&A managers, a 
small group of farmers (5 farmers) who were willing to take risks, decided to leave the firm and 
form their own association (APROVE), develop their own group certification and purchase inputs 
together. They then accepted a proposition from a regional conventional cooperative (CAISP) to 
constitute its “organic” branch. Contrary to H&A, CAISP operated under similar principles as a 
New Generation Cooperative (Harris et al., 1996). This allowed the organic farm group to benefit 
from both cleared shared rights, as well as important economies of scale by sharing storage with 
larger conventional producers. Furthermore, CAISP did not demand a right of exclusivity, which 
enabled the organic farm group to sell to other intermediaries as well. After one or two difficult 
years, the farmers began to benefit from an increase in various local intermediaries, as well as the 
growth of the CAISP itself.  
H&A went bankrupt in 2008 due to an increasingly competitive environment and with 
intermediaries that dealt with both organic and conventional produce. Having accumulated huge 
debts, the firm ceased part of its activities (70% decline in sales) and left the local growers with 
huge financial losses (up to 15.000 Euros for some of them), as well as no outlets for most of their 
produce. In response, two of its former employees supported the growers in creating their own 
cooperative (COAGRIS, created late 2008). However, today, the organization is experiencing many 
difficulties. In spite of meeting on a weekly basis, the farmers have not been successful in 
establishing rules for a collective association (in terms of production planning, sharing packing and 
delivering), or in reaching an agreement on strategic issues. Still, they managed to sell most of their 
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production to an intermediary firm, “Rio de Unna,” while commercializing a small part of 
production through a box scheme directly and through a specialized middleman. Our last  field trip 
(2009) together with comments on the situation from local colleagues (2010), left us with the 
impression that things were not turning out for the best. 
 
4.3. Export driven markets 
The two export cases described below involve the farmer cooperative COAGROSOL from the 
Southern State of Sao Paulo selling processed and fresh fruits, and the APEMB (Association of 
Ecological Producers of Marico of Bauxite) located in the North-eastern State of Clara selling 
coffee beans. 
COAGROSOL was created in 2000, derived from an association known as ABRACITRUS. 
ABRACITRUS had been established the year before by small producers (around 600) in the region 
of Itapolis (State of Sao Paulo), in order to obtain a better price for oranges. The farm-gate prices at 
the time did not even cover the costs of production. The small producers led a remarkable protest 
and drove trucks filled with their oranges to Sao Paulo, where they dumped the entire production in 
one of the city’s most important streets. The protest soon received national attention and Sao 
Paulo’s governor was obliged to negotiate with the producers. Following this protest, a small group 
of ABRACITRUS members decided to establish a cooperative, COAGROSOL, in order to trade 
within the certified Fair Trade system. At the time of its foundation, 30 producers were members of 
the cooperative and negotiations with Max Havelaar Switzerland soon took place. The SEBRAE10, a 
Brazilian capacity building agency for small entrepreneurs, played a significant role in the process. 
SEBRAE, as a non-profit corporation supported by the Brazilian government, offered training 
programs to the members of COAGROSOL in order for them to be able to engage in both export 
and organic activities. Workshops, days of fieldwork and visits to organic growers were organized, 
facilitating both the farmers’ conversion to organic and the organization of a marketing system 
(including production planning and organizational issues). The first Certified Fair trade sales were 
established in late 2000, comprising a total volume of 330 tons of orange concentrate, which was 
sold to a conventional importer. Six years later, in 2006, the cooperative was at its peak of 
development and had 120 members and 16 people working in management, administration, 
technical assistance etc., with 25 organic producers. A number of members were no longer orange 
growers, as the cooperative decided to diversify its production and sales. While some of the 
specialized orange producers began growing other fruits (sold fresh, as well as processed), more 
specialized vegetable growers joined the cooperative. Today, the main source of income and the 
activities of COAGROSOL is still orange production for export, but a larger part is now dedicated 
to other fresh fruits and processed products, both organic and conventional, such as oranges, limes, 
mangos, guavas, tomatoes and onions, mostly sold on the domestic market.  
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APEMB was founded in 1996, comprising 158 coffee growers, of which 110 were certified organic. 
When it comes to coffee, Brazil produces nearly a third of the world's coffee harvest, but virtually 
all of it is low grade "filler", and most of the coffee, is sun-grown in the southern coffee regions of 
São Paulo and Paraná States. However, farmers in the Baturité Mountains of the North-eastern state 
of Ceará and a region of the Atlantic Forest had kept some shade-grown coffee, since the local 
climatic conditions, with seasonal heavy rain and a dry season did not permit sun-grown coffee11. 
During the 1990s, the coffee yields in the area decreased, which was mainly due to a lack of 
pruning and coffee plant aging. In parallel, deforestation, soil erosion, the destruction of 
groundwater supplies and threats to the water supply in the State capital Fortaleza, were increasing. 
Pressure from civil society groups then brought about a State conservation plan, the Baturité 
Mountains Environmental Protection Area, comprising environmental restrictions on soil 
utilization, as well as agro-ecological support for shaded coffee farms. One of the activities was the 
Projeto Café Ecológico, which started in 1995 and was conducted by the NGO CEPEMA 
Foundation12, which has links with the Swedish NGO part of the international network, "Land of the 
Future." CEPEMA trained the farmers in agro-ecological practices, how to run a coop and a market 
association, while providing them with new coffee plants, fruit and shade tree species. Along with 
the Swedish NGO, CEPEMA drove the process of establishing the APEMB farmers’ association 
and establishing the first market connection with the Swedish roaster, ‘Classic Kaffe.’ APEMB 
worked on quality improvements, mainly through the introduction of better drying practices and 
bean selection. In the first years, the Banco do Nordeste provided financial support to pay for the 
certification costs, which amounted to US$ 5,000. In 1997, APEMB exported its first 6 tons to 
Classic Kaffe through a multiple agreement including CEPEMA, the Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation, the Land of Future International Network and the State government of Ceará. In 
1999, production had increased to 30 tons, which represented 60%of the total amount produced by 
APEMB. The producers received US$160 per bag, compared with US$100-110 per bag on the 
conventional market. Part of the premium was due to being able to sell Arabica13 coffee, whereas 
before they used to sell "Conillon" (Robusta) coffee, which fetches a much lower price.  
However, both COAGROSOL and APEMB ran into severe problems when their international 
commodity markets began to saturate, which resulted in the wholesalers/importing food companies 
putting pressure on the producers’ sales price.  
From the start, COAGROSOL was dependent on one conventional importer for the main part of its 
production. This led to several kinds of ‘hold ups’ initiated by the importer towards the cooperative 
during negotiations and market exchange ex post. Firstly, when conventional farm-gate prices 
dipped below the guaranteed Fair trade minimum price (FTMP) of 1,200 US $/MT (metric ton), the 
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11 In practice, the growers of APEMB cultivate individual coffee plants among bananas, mangos, tangerines, cashews, 
sugar cane, carnaúba palms, pau brasil, aloe vera, jaca and eucalyptus. Compared with sun-grown coffee elsewhere in 
Brazil, the shade-grown coffee produces a lower yield, due to lower plant density (3,000 plants/ha) and a lower yield 
per plant. 
12 Fundação Cultural Educacional Popular em Defesa do Meio Ambiente ; Popular Educational and Cultural Foundation 
in Defense of the Environment. 
13 APEMB relies almost exclusively on a variety of Arabica bean called Catuaí. 
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importer contravened the contract and paid a lower price. Conversely, when conventional prices 
increased above the FTMP, the cooperative was only paid the FTMP. Secondly, payments on frozen 
concentrate orange juice (FCOJ), which was the most important source of income for the producers, 
were held back by the importer during negotiations on other products traded from COAGROSOL. 
Finally, when payment took place it was not always the full amount. In 2006, dependency on one or 
few major buyers downstream was felt particularly severely when the Swiss supermarket chain 
MIGROS decided to stop its trading with the importer that was buying from COAGROSOL due to 
dissatisfaction with the importer. At the time, MIGROS was purchasing 70%of the volumes 
produced by COAGROSOL. On top of this, export prices declined in 2008 due to the depreciation 
of the US Dollar, and the producers of the coop were not paid for their deliveries. This eventually 
led to a conflict between the producers and management, as well as a conflict among the producers 
themselves when a new management board was elected. Some producers decided to leave the 
cooperative and, in 2009, COAGROSOL decided to streamline its operations by ceasing to trade 
organic vegetables. COAGROSOL had been selling its organic vegetables to ‘Horte e Arte’ (H&A), 
but lost this market when the intermediary collapsed in 2008. Since then, COAGROSOL has been 
struggling to find new outlets for its production. On the one hand, has maintained part of its 
activities within the export system by connecting to other Fair Trade organizations (notably 
Altereco in France). On the other hand, COAGROSOL has reallocated part of its products through 
intermediaries providing supermarkets with orange juice, which is sold under the retailers’ own 
brand.  
The APEMB growers suffered from the dramatic increase in the world supply of organic coffee 
from 1997 to 2000, which led to predatory competition among coffee growers. In 2000, Classic 
Kaffe decided to stop buying from APEMB, since agreement could not be reached on lower 
producer prices. A new export opportunity with the North-American Zenway emerged, but this was 
not finalized due to a lack of finance for commercialization, the high cost of certification, as well as 
internal problems within the association. However, despite problems with the sale and export of 
organic coffee, CEPEMA stayed on and helped the producers to redefine their project's strategies, 
launching and developing a network for the local marketing of coffee, fruit and vegetables which 
would, at the same time, avoid the high certification costs, while potentially achieving modest price 
premiums. The project strategy was to explore the growth in tourism and to deliver baskets (a box 
scheme) to the district capital, Fortaleza. Reports in the news confirmed that the sale of "Café 
Ecológico Pico Alto" was launched in March 2003 in Fortaleza (FAO, 2003). The coffee is 
promoted as being "certified" by CEPEMA, and the fact that it was once exported, is advertised as 




5.1. The three Food Systems: Benefits and limitations for smallholders 
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The concept of family farming entails a broad diversity of realities and is being increasingly 
criticized, but it is still a federative concept, which is politically operational and which echoes a 
project of society refusing the continuity of a “modernization” paradigm, which promotes capitalist 
agriculture and the concentration of land and yields, with a concomitant exclusion of the greater 
part of agricultural and rural populations (Graziano da Silva, 2001). In line with this perspective, 
Brazilian researchers emphasize the importance of refraining from promoting policies that force 
family farming into the capitalist market competition mode of production (Abramovay, 2000; 
Almeida, 2002; Brandenbourg, 2008; Schneider and Niederle, 2010). They claim that this would 
trigger exclusion, as well as the creation of a new rural elite who would become the new managers 
of agricultural capitalist farms. Instead, these authors are in favour of the agro-ecological model. 
They argue that this would promote solidarity and cooperation against competition and exclusion, 
and would value labour instead of technical inputs, and facilitate the acquisition of autonomy and 
the empowerment of farmers. Such a defence of the agro-ecological model echoes broader 
enthusiasm for Alternative Food Systems. Allen et al. (2003), Clarke et al. (2008) or Kneafsey 
(2010) argue that the various types of Alternative Food Systems illustrate a post-modern “peasant” 
resistance and a way to combat globalization and neo-liberal forces by constructing local 
relationships of trust, concern and reciprocity.   
 
The case stories from the AFS support, to a large extent,  the opinions of those in favour of the 
agro-ecological position. Emphasis is put on both reshaping the transaction process and facilitating 
cooperation among producers in a way that promotes solidarity, cooperation, information sharing, 
participative decision-making and the building of social ties. Such foundations enabled the farmers 
to maintain control of their developmental process, as well as the full ownership on their products. 
At the same time, farmers benefited from a continuous learning process, which was supported by a 
strong participative environment combining autonomy building with empowerment dynamics. If 
divergences, tensions and conflicts arose within the groups, Schultz (2006) and Brancher (2009), do 
not outline any process of exclusion, uneven capitalization, or land concentration at the farm level. 
Capitalization may have occurred (we don’t know), but, as described by the authors, most of it 
seems to have occurred on a collective scale on the basis of shared properties and refers to 
transformation, delivery, marketing and communication facilities. 
Conversely, our cases which illustrate the inclusion of smallholders in the second and the third food 
System (respectively domestic and export), show much more contrasted results. Participating in a 
food system which is driven by major retailer chains entails entering into a highly competitive 
market economy in which powerful capitalistic actors not only impose very specific and stringent 
transaction conditions on the smallholders, but also constant changes to delivery requirements. 
From our own investigations in Veravà, we found that what at first appeared to be a promising 
opportunity and financial bailout for the smallholders, turned out to be a highly competitive and 
exclusive system, in which only the “best,” i.e. those adhering to an entrepreneurial logic, could 
succeed. While a number of the farmers from Veravà became excluded, continuous price-squeezes 
and a need for investments to remain competitive, led most of the others to increase their production 
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volumes, triggering the concentration of land and yields,  which was to the benefit of a minority of 
the growers, who became managers of small agricultural holdings in some cases14.  
Another negative aspect, which can be derived from our cases, is that the farmers have difficulties 
in overcoming the high transaction costs when entering the modern food procurement system. First 
of all, they have to be able to deliver a certain ‘critical mass of supply,’ which is only possible if 
they supply to a private intermediary, or if they join a market association, or a cooperative. 
Secondly, the farmers then face an economic trade-off between loosing potential profit margins to 
the intermediary, or they have to endure risky investment costs in establishing a coop for packing, 
processing and storage, as well as the time needed to coordinate and market their production. Often, 
farmers do not have the time and the skills to manage these tasks so they hire a management team. 
Organizing a business in this way can lead to the so called ‘principal–agent problem’15, which arises 
when participants from an organization (farmers being the « principals ») entitle and compensate an 
« agent » (management) for performing certain acts, which are useful to them. In this situation, 
mechanisms must be set-up so the « principals » can ensure the accountability of the agent. 
However, in both our cases, farmers paid the price of failing to do so. A major reason for this is the 
strength of the paternalistic relations in the Brazilian business environment, which often prevent 
clearly shared property rights in the organizations16.  
Considering the modern export food system, the cases documented here illustrate the difficulties 
that smallholders face when attempting to seize the opportunities presented by an extremely 
dynamic and rapidly growing global organic market. In both our cases, the farmer coops 
experienced “hold-up” situations initiated by their downstream partners. This ultimately forced the 
APEMB to exit the export market and triggered a severe crisis within the COAGROSOL. Not only 
are these outcomes a direct result of the farmers being dependent on a single buyer, they also 
illustrate the harsh conditions imposed by a global market in which price volatility and competition 
are very strong. Even if organic production is accompanied by a Fair Trade marketing system, such 
as the Coagrosol case, the results are not very convincing, since the buyer apparently did not follow 
the rules and the market ethics established under the Fair Trade scheme. In both cases, a crisis in the 
coops was triggered when the buyers turned to other more price competitive suppliers. However, 
our cases points to other aspects of system weaknesses. In the coffee case, the system was in no way 
viable without the financial aid granted by the State to pay for certification. When this support 
disappeared, the farmers were unable to shift to other export market opportunities. In the orange 
case (COAGROSOL), the farmers had to diversify their production and activities in the coop in 
order to ensure its financial viability, generating the same principal-agent problems as those 
observed in the cases operating under the domestic food system.  
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"In Brazil, where hierarchy and personal relations differentiate the citizens, the magnetism of a specific individual is 
highlighted by his relationships. Paternalism,, that that sprouts directly from this combination of power concentration 
and personalism (Tanure and Duarte, 2005), is still typical of latin american management in certain context and notably 




Summing up all three food systems, we see that the arguments in support of pursuing the agro-
ecological development based model for small holder inclusion are confirmed in our case study 
analysis. 
However, the cases from the AFS show that not all farmers are satisfied with their conditions and 
opportunities for market exchange under these systems. Recall that AFSs in Brazil are not only 
conceived to benefit smallholders alone, but also to establish solidarity and fair-trade relations with 
low-income urban consumers. This leaves farmers with only limited earnings when joining AFSs. 
As illustrated by our cases, this limitation drove some of the farmers to diversify and sell part of 
their production to higher-income consumers, thereby disavowing their original commitment. In 
one of the cases (ARPASUL), a number of the farmers even chose to quit the alternative system and 
move into the domestic oriented food system driven by the supermarkets.  
The overall problem though does not seem to be about earnings per se, but more about the balance 
and ‘trade off’ between the huge amount of time farmers invest in coordination and exchange 
practices within the AFS and the income the farmers receive in return. What may be interpreted as 
richness for some farmers (building social ties, participative decision-making), may indeed be 
experienced as high coordination and transaction costs for others. This means that only a strong 
adherence to the ideology and values inherent in the AFS will enable farmers to experience them as 
positive. Otherwise, they are likely to leave the system. 
Leaving the “alternative” system was, for the APRASUL farmers, strongly dependent on the 
possibility to engage in what they perceived as a more attractive opportunity, i.e. the progressive 
growth and structuring of the supermarket procurement system. Indeed, entering this system offers 
the smallholders the opportunity to dramatically increase their production volumes and – at least in 
the beginning – their income. Likewise, it also meant less involvement in highly time consuming 
farmers’ collectives, as intermediary firms with a professional management team took charge of the 
important tasks of coordinating and marketing the farmers’ fresh produce. As a result, it enabled 
farmers with a more entrepreneurial spirit to take advantage of other market opportunities. Such 
attitudes echo the growing aspirations of farmers in rural contexts, such as the ones studied here. 
Indeed, many Brazilian rural zones have experienced profound changes these last decades. 
Relations with the cities have gained in scope and density, resulting in the penetration of modern 
lifestyles and important social re-compositions (Campanhola and da Silva, 2000 ; Wilkinson, 2008). 
Even if social life is still marked by traditional forms of sociability and solidarity in many of these 
rural areas, change often involves the weakening of these values and an increase in capitalist and 
individualist oriented logics. Smallholders are becoming critically included in the consumer society 
and wish to benefit from its fruits and facilities and they therefore require  a higher income. Values 
are changing and merit is increasingly achieved through economic success, thereby stimulating the 
flourishing of entrepreneurial logic.  
 
5.2. The role of facilitators 
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All the case stories analyzed here show the crucial role played by non-profit “facilitating” 
organizations in facilitating the inclusion of smallholders in the organic sector, whatever food 
system is under consideration. In every case, and according to the perspective adopted here, the 
involvement of these entities was crucial in lowering the high transaction costs ex-ante faced by 
small farmers when trying to meet consumers within the organized food procurement systems of 
specific organic arenas. This was achieved by, a) offering technical and educational support for the 
conversion to organic production, b) supporting farmers in establishing market organizations 
(associations or cooperatives), c) bridging actors (farmers, distributors, consumers) and reinforcing 
their respective trust towards each other, which contributed to a positive market environment of 
simple exchange. Likewise, the involvement of these facilitators made it possible to connect the 
smallholders to a broader resource supporting environment: e.g. non-profit regional to international 
organizations, including Fair Trade organizations, public agencies, consumer associations, etc. This 
type of system innovation further enabled the farmers to access funding - from both governmental 
agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations – which later turned out to be crucial for the 
farmers’ initial and ongoing needs to innovate in the labor, product and production processes.  
One of the main distinctive features within this set of experiences is the varying availability of 
ongoing support for the farmer groups ex-post. In only three of the documented experiences 
(AECIA, APRASUL, AEMB) did the facilitating entities become involved beyond the initial step 
of inclusion to offer continuous support in the developmental and marketing process. Basically, 
they helped the farmers to revise their marketing strategies and to reorganize their collective 
organization when the farmers were facing different types of crisis and internal, as well as external, 
tensions . Conversely, in the three other experiences (APAC, H&A, COAGROSOL), lack of such 
ongoing support was severely felt, due to the fact that the farmers were included in highly 
competitive markets with strong unequal bargaining power along the food chains. Still today, the 
farmers involved in orange production for export within the Fair Trade Systems are struggling to 
survive. Hence, our case analysis points to the fact that there is a great need for smallholders to 
achieve various kinds of support ex-post when entering the competitive commercial food systems, 
whether it is for the domestic, or export oriented markets.  
The problem is that NGOs, in our cases, were only involved in the development process ex-post 
when farmers were included in the AFS, and that public and para-public entities, in all cases, were 
absent ex-post from all food systems. This points to a serious limitation concerning the involvement 
of NGOs and faith-based organizations as facilitators in the current Brazilian context. In line with 
the Brazilian agro-ecological movement, their activities are strongly oriented by values - stressing 
transactional processes of trust, solidarity and social welfare – which makes them very critical of 
market-orientated dynamics, such as those exemplified by supermarket driven food systems. NGOs 
and faith-based organizations are therefore reluctant to support farmers who are involved in these 
food systems and, from a broader perspective, any dynamic farmer change that is dependent on 
capital and is commercially market-oriented. This means that in the current context, farmers 
included in the modern supermarket driven food systems can hardly rely on NGOs or “faith-based 
organizations” to help them face the huge challenges they experience in these systems.  
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Our work thus points to the fact that there is a serious need to improve the Brazilian public and 
para-public advisory systems, dedicated to capacity building and extension for smallholders, 
alongside the activists’ organizations (NGO, Faith-based etc.). Structures such as SEBRAE, 
EMATER, which are State specific, or “Casas da agricultura” (agricultural chambers) should be 
reinforced so that they are able to provide support at various developmental stages. This would 
include training farmers in business and organizational issues, ensuring that proper Principal-
Agents relations are established when helping farmers to form coops or market associations, helping 
in instances of conflict to secure sustainable resolutions, finding reorientation strategies for farmers 
and groups of famers who show a willingness to either replace, or expand into another food system, 
or even exit agriculture altogether to find employment outside the agricultural sector.  
 
Conclusion 
The Brazilian left wing Government elected in 2002, and re-elected in 2006 and 2010, promised to 
democratize national policies and intensify the fight against poverty and social, political and 
cultural exclusion. Over the last 8 years, discourses followed by concrete actions have emphasized 
reforms to establish new partnerships between the public- and private sector, civil society and 
Research Institutes in order to deal with economic development and poverty alleviation 
(Hogenboom and Jilberto, 2009).  
In this regard, organic farming is seen as a potential solution to improve the livelihood of 
smallholders. In Brazil, the organic sector is growing and is represented in four food systems: The 
AFS, a modern food procurement system oriented towards a commercial domestic and export 
market and a public procurement system.  
NGOs, faith-based organizations and public related entities are strongly committed to the inclusion 
of smallholders in the organic market, which operates in these various food systems. However, 
smallholders encounter an array of multifaceted problems as they progress, which are not addressed 
when it comes to the modern commercialized food procurement systems. 
Since NGOs and faith-based organizations are reluctant to support smallholders in commercially 
market oriented food systems, efforts should be taken to provide a policy frame, which enables 
public related entities to both secure a sustainable inclusion, as well as exit strategies for those who 
experience exclusion. It is important that such a policy frame provides solutions to the broad 
diversity of constraints, motivations and perspectives held by Brazilian smallholders, whether they 
are keen to maintain traditional lifestyles, or adopt more modern ones.  
Examples of elements in such a policy frame could be a) the establishment of a task force pro-
actively helping farmers to develop clear rules for setting up a cooperative, or a market 
organization, b) mediating and functioning as a neutral third party when crises occur in farmers’ 
organizations, c) facilitate dynamic flows between the different food systems, thereby compensating 
the bias of the NGOs and, d) provide relevant exit strategies whether related to non-farm activities, 
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